We study the efficiency of internal capital markets at state-controlled and privately owned business groups in China. Using highly granular data on within-group capital flows, we document stark differences: while private groups allocate more capital to units with better investment opportunities, state groups do the opposite. Product market competition and external monitoring by minority private shareholders help discipline state groups' tendency to ignore investment opportunities. We conjecture that capital allocations at state groups reflect the private career objectives of their chairmen. We show that promotion depends not on increasing profitability but on avoiding layoffs. Consistent with a career motive, we find that capital allocations are used to prop up large and struggling employers, but only if the chairman has a realistic chance of being promoted and if the cost of self-interested behavior is not too high.
Our setting has some parallels with studies of internal capital markets at multi-segment firms in the U.S., insofar as we test for the efficiency of capital allocations, but our focus on state groups is novel. Besides having few state firms, the U.S. also suffers from two data handicaps compared to China. First, unlike group member firms in China, business segments in the U.S. are rarely stock market listed and so standard proxies for their investment opportunities (such as Tobin's Q) cannot be estimated directly. Second, U.S. firms have to disclose little segment-level data, 2 unlike Chinese stock market listed firms, which are required to disclose detailed data on intra-group capital flows pursuant to a listing rule in force since 2004. These data, which are highly granular, allow us to test for the efficiency of capital allocations by measuring how sensitive to its investment opportunities a firm's inflow of capital from other group members is.
Using data on all internal capital flows among group member firms at 211 state business groups and 76 private business groups over the period from 2004 to 2013, we find startling differences. Private groups allocate more capital to units with better investment opportunities, consistent with maximizing group value. This is true despite the well documented fact that private enterprises in China tend to suffer from financial constraints: they are often creditrationed by state banks and face much higher interest rates (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005) . State groups, by contrast, reallocate capital from high-Q to low-Q member firms. This pattern is remarkably robust in the data.
Two pieces of evidence suggest that the negative sensitivity of capital allocations to Q at China's state groups reflects deliberate policy. The first is evidence suggesting that product market competition acts to constrain state groups' tendency to ignore price signals. Specifically, we find that exogenous increases in product market competition (resulting from cuts in tariffs on goods imported into China) appear to put pressure on state groups to allocate capital less inefficiently. Conversely, reductions in competition appear to reduce product market discipline on state groups. The second piece of evidence is that state groups divert fewer cash flows away from high-Q firms which they have less equity control over, suggesting that outside minority investors monitor their capital allocation decisions.
Our empirical results suggest that state capitalism does a poor job of allocating capital efficiently, at least in the context of China's state business groups. This likely reflects the fact that the objective function of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which ultimately controls most functions of state, is not exclusively the maximization of profits or shareholder value but also the maintenance of a 'harmonious society.' Consistent with this, we document that the chairmen of state groups in our sample are rewarded with promotions to higher political office not only for raising productivity but also for avoiding large scale job losses. Clearly, these aims can be in conflict (maintaining overstaffing may make raising productivity difficult) and over time may be incompatible (subsidizing unproductive jobs may divert resources away from creating productive ones).
Our evidence suggests that state-group chairmen let these career incentives influence their internal capital allocation decisions. Consistent with chairmen maximizing their prospects for political promotions, we find that capital allocations are used to prop up large and struggling employers with poor prospects. Such behavior could in principle be in the CCP's best interest, as it may help avoid layoffs, but two further tests suggest that state group chairmen's interests are potentially misaligned.
First, we show that internal capital allocations are only distorted if the group chairman is below the age of 60 and so is eligible for another promotion under the CCP's rules. Second, we find that capital allocations are significantly less distorted after crackdowns on corruption among holders of high political offices in the province in which a state group is headquartered. To the extent that such crackdowns are perceived as exogenous shocks to the risk of being held accountable for self-serving behavior, state-group chairmen may prefer to lie low for a while and not misallocate capital for their private ends. Our results are consistent with this interpretation.
Our paper contributes to the literature on state and private firms, surveyed in Megginson and Netter (2001) , by providing the first empirical comparison of their capital allocation decisions.
Prior literature identifies two sources of inefficiencies at state firms. The "political view" argues that politicians extend a "grabbing hand" to divert public resources for their own benefit (Shleifer 1998, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1999) . The "social view" argues that the state pursues non-commercial objectives beyond maximizing profits or shareholder value (Aharoni 1986 , Toninelli 2000 . These objectives include job creation, regional development, and income redistribution. Meeting them entails keeping redundant workers, pricing goods and services below market (and sometimes below cost), locating plants in uneconomic areas, or keeping uneconomic facilities open (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2012) .
Our evidence is consistent with both sources of inefficiency. The influence of group chairmen's career concerns is suggestive of the political view, while allowing capital to flow to struggling group members with poor investment opportunities is suggestive of the social view.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on business groups. This literature, reviewed in Stein (2003) , emphasizes two views of internal capital markets. According to the 'bright side' view, divisions compete for corporate resources while group management picks winners based on the quality of their investment opportunities (Khanna and Tice 2001, Peyer and Shivdasani 2001) . According to the 'dark side' view, rent-seeking behavior by divisional managers may lead to inefficient capital allocations (Lamont 1997 , Scharfstein and Stein 1998 , Shin and Stulz 1998 , or Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 2000 , Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein 2002 , Motta 2003 , Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010 . Our evidence suggests that for private groups in China, the 'bright side' of internal capital markets appears to dominate. For Chinese state groups, on the other hand, the 'dark side' of internal capital markets appears to dominate. Interestingly, on this score, we find that the negative sensitivity of capital allocations to Q at state groups is particularly strong for member firms that are geographically closer to group headquarters.
Finally, our paper contributes to the growing literature on corporate governance in China.
Prior work shows that the presence of outside private investors at state owned enterprises improves firm value (Wei, Xie, and Zhang 2005) , operating performance (Sun and Tong 2003),
transparency (Gul, Kim, and Qiu 2010) , and pay-for-performance sensitivity (Cao, Pan, and Tian 2011) . We add to this the finding that outside private investors make it harder for state groups to divert resources away from member firms with good investment opportunities.
Empirical Model
Our objective is to analyze how efficiently state and private business groups in China allocate capital among member firms via their internal capital markets. Our empirical models estimate the extent to which a given business group's internal capital allocations to its member firms correlate with the member firms' individual investment opportunities in a particular year. According to neoclassical theories of capital budgeting, this correlation should be positive: the parent should allocate more capital to a unit the better the unit's investment opportunities.
This prediction mirrors capital budgeting rules familiar from standard MBA textbooks. Such rules call for managers to fund all projects (or in our context, all member firms) that have a positive expected net present value (NPV). For firms (or in our context, groups) that are financially constrained, the rules call for managers to rank all projects by their expected profitability per unit of capital invested and to fund all profitable projects in descending order until the capital runs out.
Expected NPVs being unobservable, the empirical literature on internal capital markets uses Tobin's Q to capture investment opportunities, and we follow the same approach. As Almeida, Kim, and Kim (2014) note, work on internal capital markets in the U.S. is often hampered by the fact that a multi-segment firm's divisions are rarely themselves stock market listed. Their
Tobin's Q can thus not be directly measured, even if the parent firm is listed. Outside the U.S., in contrast, it is common for business groups to include multiple firms that are stock market listed, greatly facilitating the measurement of each such firm's Q. A prominent example of a group structure of this kind is Korea's chaebols. 3 China's business groups is another.
Two features of China's stock market listing rules greatly facilitate our analysis. The first is that all listed firms are required to disclose detailed information about related-party transactions in the footnotes of their annual reports. 4 This rule allows us to measure intra-group capital flows among group member firms at a highly granular level, including intra-group loans, cash advances, and so on. 5 In the U.S., in contrast, multi-segment firms need only disclose segmentlevel data on total sales, cash flow, and capital expenditure, necessitating creative but highly indirect approaches to infer intra-group capital flows. 3 See Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) , and Baek, Kang, and Lee (2006) , Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2008) , and Almeida et al. (2011) . Our approach follows theirs in using listed member firms' Qs to capture investment opportunities. It departs from theirs in using highly granular data on intra-group capital flows that are uniquely available in China. 4 Prior work uses these mandated disclosures to study whether controlling shareholders in China expropriate minority shareholders. See Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010), Jian and Wong (2010), Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2009), and Peng, Wei, and Yang (2011) . 5 The rule defines 24 separate categories of related party transactions among as many as 12 separate categories of related parties. See Appendix A for further details. 6 For example, Shin and Stulz (1998) and Shin and Park (1999) regress a segment's CAPEX on a proxy for its (unobservable) Q, its cash flow, and the cash flows of its parent's other segments. A positive coefficient for the latter is interpreted as evidence that the segment is a net recipient of capital. For a general critique of approaches of this kind, see Billett and Mauer (2003) .
The second listing rule we exploit requires listed firms to disclose detailed ownership information about their controlling shareholders, including the structure of any pyramidal chains leading up to the ultimate controlling shareholder. This rule helps identify the group membership and ultimate control of each listed firm in China. Together, the two listing rules allow us to measure the direction, magnitude, and nature of all internal capital flows that occur within each business group in China.
Using the data described in the next section, we estimate regressions of the following general form:
for firm i operating in industry k and belonging to business group j in year t. The dependent variable, net flow, is a measure of firm i's (potentially negative) net inflow of capital from elsewhere in its business group. The main variable of interest is Q i,t-1 , the firm's beginning-ofyear investment opportunities as measured by its lagged Tobin's Q.
If business groups in China follow neoclassical capital budgeting rules and allocate internal capital efficiently, net flow should increase in Q (i.e., 0   ).
7 Testing whether 0   requires some care. The reason is that investment opportunities vary both within and across groups. The right variation to exploit is the within-group one. To see why, note that one group's best opportunity could be less promising than another group's worst opportunity, yet it could easily attract greater funding. The reason is simple: each group can only fund those opportunities that it has access to, so both groups in this example should rank their individual opportunities and allocate capital in descending order. How one group's opportunities compare to those of other groups is of no consequence.
To ensure that we estimate  from within-group variation in the way each group allocates capital across its various member firms, we include a set of group-year fixed effects, t j,  . These fixed effects allow us to test whether business groups allocate relatively more capital to relatively higher-Q member firms, allowing each group to have its own time-varying average level of capital flows and its own time-varying average level of Q.
The regression in equation (1) controls for a set of lagged firm-level characteristics X i,t-1 , described in the next section, as well as a set of industry-year fixed effects, t k ,  . The latter filter out the effects of industry-level booms and busts on capital allocation decisions by removing time-varying industry-level shocks that affect all firms in a particular industry in a given year. To ensure a sufficient number of firms per industry, we use the Chinese Securities Regulation Commission's twelve industry groups. 8 We cluster standard errors at the business group level. This allows for serial correlation in a member firm over time and, importantly, for arbitrary correlations of the error term across member firms belonging to the same business group in any given year as well as over time.
Sample and Data
Much of our data comes from the CSMAR database, which contains accounting and ownership data for all stock market listed firms in China. We use the ownership data to identify all listed firms that have the same ultimate controlling shareholder and so belong to the same business group. In the typical Chinese business group, the parent is unlisted; it controls group member firms through direct equity stakes or via a pyramidal structure (Fan, Wang, and Zhang 2013) . For state groups, the ultimate parent is usually either the State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which is based in Beijing and administers assets belonging to the central government, or a provincial or local-level equivalent. For private groups, the ultimate parent is usually a family. Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2008) , we require a group to have a minimum of two listed member firms in any given year.
Using these criteria, we identify a total of 321 business groups over the period from 2004 to 2013. Of these, 230 are state groups and 91 are private groups. Owing to the need to construct suitable lags, our empirical models use data for 287 business groups (211 state groups and 76 private ones), with a total of 5,013 firm-year observations. Between them, the state groups control 660 stock market listed firms (which we call state owned enterprises or SOEs) while the private groups control a total of 166 listed firms. In addition, business groups invariably also control unlisted firms. While the CSMAR database does not cover unlisted firms, our measure of within-group capital allocations, described next, captures all internal cash flows that listed firms receive, regardless of whether they originate at a listed or unlisted group member firm.
Measuring Intra-Group Capital Allocations
To measure within-group capital allocations, we use detailed data on related-party transactions among group member firms and other controlling entities, such as the ultimate controlling shareholder. Disclosure of such transactions became mandatory for all stock market listed firms in 2004, which thus marks the beginning of our sample period. Following Li, Sun, and Wang (2004) , we compute the net capital inflow a firm receives from other group members in a given year as the sum of the differences between accounts payable and accounts receivable, between notes payable and notes receivable, and between advances and accounts prepaid. We then scale by beginning-of-year total assets to make the net capital inflow numbers comparable across firms. Net inflows can be positive or negative, depending on whether a firm is a net recipient or a net source of capital within the group.
It is important to note that we do not use aggregate line items to construct these numbers.
Aggregate line items (such as those available in any firm's income statement) include not only transactions between related firms within a group but also transactions involving end-customers and unaffiliated suppliers. The great advantage of China's mandated disclosure of related part transactions is that firms must break out capital flows involving affiliated firms at a highly granular level. It is these data we use to construct our measure of within-group capital allocations. Appendix A contains further details on the construction of this measure.
Control Variables
Our main variable of interest is Tobin's Q, a popular proxy for a firm's investment opportunities. Following the literature, we measure Tobin's Q as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of the firm's total assets.
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In addition, our empirical models include the following controls that are standard in the internal capital markets literature: return on assets and log total assets (Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru 2007); leverage (Bae, Cheon, and Kang 2008) and collateral (Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006) ; the ultimate owner's voting and cash flow rights (Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan 2002) ; institutional ownership (Khanna and Palepu 2000) ; and an indicator set equal to one if the firm's CEO is a shareholder (Xuan 2009). In addition, we follow Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) and include an indicator for firms that are in 'special treatment' (a label China's stock exchanges assign to firms at risk of delisting). Summing the coefficients for the main and interaction effects in column 2, the average SOE experiences a net capital outflow of 0.26% of its assets for every unit increase in its Q (p=0.011).
Summary Statistics

Capital Allocations in State and Private Business Groups
The difference in the Q sensitivity of private and state owned enterprises is both economically and statistically significant (p<0.001). Columns 3 and 4 confirm these findings by estimating capital-allocation regressions separately for state and private groups.
These results point to a fundamental difference in the way state and private business groups' internal capital markets work: while private groups allocate capital to those of their member firms with the best investment opportunities, state groups reallocate capital from high-Q to low-
This pattern need not imply that state groups allocate capital inefficiently. It is possible, for example, that Q is somehow measured with substantially more error for SOEs than for private enterprises, biasing the coefficient estimate. To shed further light on this possibility, Table 3 explores how product market competition affects the relation between internal capital allocations and Q in China. If the negative Q sensitivity in state groups is the result of deliberate policy, we expect increases in product market competition to put pressure on state groups to allocate capital less inefficiently. Reductions in competition, on the other hand, would reduce product market discipline on state groups. If instead the negative Q sensitivity in state groups reflects measurement error, changes in product market competition should have no effect.
To capture exogenous increases (reductions) in product market competition, we follow on Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) individual Q ratios) even more.
In marked contrast, private groups do not alter their internal capital allocations significantly in the wake of tariff-induced changes in product market competition. Lin, Cai, and Li 1998 , Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007 , or Lin and Li 2008 . Table 4 investigates the influence of private outside shareholders. Column 1 shows that state groups allocate more capital to member firms the larger a presence private shareholders have. A one standard-deviation increase in the aggregate size of the equity stake held by private investors increases an SOE's capital allocation by 0.45% of assets, all else equal (p=0.027). For private groups, on the other hand, there is no significant effect on how much capital member firms are allocated (p=0.371).
In addition to affecting the level of internal capital allocations in state groups, private investors may also affect the Q sensitivity. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 allow the Q sensitivity in state groups to depend on whether outside private investors own much or little equity (evaluated at the sample median). This conditioning variable varies across firms in a given business group, so to ensure that we continue to estimate within-group capital allocations, we keep the group structure intact by estimating fully interacted models. These allow each coefficient to vary with the characteristic in question while including group-year fixed effects as before.
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The results indicate that private investors do indeed affect the Q sensitivity. The coefficient on Q is -0.175 (p=0.063) for state enterprises with above median private ownership and a significantly more negative -0.684 (p=0.015) for those below the median. Thus, the presence of outside private shareholders appears to mitigate the negative Q sensitivity in state groups, as expected. This mirrors the mitigating effects of competitive pressure from the product market.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 allow the Q sensitivity in state groups to depend on the size of the group parent's equity stake in the member firm. This reveals that high-Q member firms see particularly large outflows when the parent controls a larger fraction of their equity capital. The coefficients on Q are -0.167 (p=0.068) and -0.830 (p=0.002) for member firms with below and above median parent ownership stakes, respectively -a difference that is not only statistically significant (p=0.013) but also large economically. These patterns are consistent with state groups finding it harder to divert cash flows away from high-Q firms which they have less equity control over. The results in Tables 2, 3 , and 4 are consistent with the interpretation that state groups allocate internal capital flows inefficiently. Within state groups, capital flows from high-Q to low-Q firms, the opposite of what we see among private groups in China. 13 This tendency to allocate capital to the firms with the relatively worst investment opportunities is stronger when product market competition is relatively weak and when the group parent has tighter control over the member firm. The tendency is weaker when product market competition is relatively strong and when private investors own a larger slice of the member firm's equity.
We next turn to the question why state groups may allocate their internal capital in this manner.
Promotions and Demotions
Our working hypothesis is that internal capital allocation decisions at state groups reflect, to an important extent, the private objectives of the group chairman. Top managers at China's SOEs are appointed by the government and tend to be bureaucrats (Li 1998) . Their main path for advancement in the state sector is a promotion to a government office of higher rank (Li and Zhou 2005) . Every three years, SOE managers are formally evaluated for a potential political promotion (Du, Tang, and Young 2012, Bradshaw, Liao, and Ma 2013) . The criteria are laid down by the CCP. They can easily be in conflict. Marks are given for "operational performance"
(50%) and "political qualities, coordination skills, and personal integrity" (50%). The former includes productivity and financial performance; the latter covers such areas as "making politically responsible decisions" and "corporate social responsibility", which is widely interpreted as avoiding layoffs.
14 This career structure opens up the possibility that state groups allocate capital in a way that best serves the chairman's career objectives. To investigate this possibility, we first explore how key commercial events at the group affect the chairman's chance of promotion or risk of demotion. The key commercial events we focus on are mass layoffs, large-scale hiring, productivity improvements or impairments, and large changes in profitability. (See Appendix A for further details.) The analysis uses information on the career progressions of all group chairmen in our sample, hand-collected from government and party websites. We define a promotion as a move to a political office of higher rank. 15 Analogously, a demotion is a move to a political position of lower rank. Table 6 reports the results of Cox proportional hazard models, estimated with time-varying covariates. These models estimate the effect of a key commercial event on the likelihood that the group chairman is promoted (columns 1-3) or demoted (columns 4-6) in the next year. We also control for group size (log total group assets) and the chairman's age.
Column 1 shows that chairing a larger group significantly increases the chance of promotion (p<0.001). Holding group size constant, group chairmen are punished for mass layoffs (p=0.029) and rewarded for large productivity improvements (p=0.002). Both events have a sizeable impact on their careers. This can best be seen by converting the coefficients reported in Table 6 We then take deviations between actual and predicted net capital inflows for each SOE member firm. Finally, to arrive at a group-level summary statistic of internal capital misallocation, we take the group-year standard deviation of the estimated member-firm-level deviations. A small standard deviation indicates that a state group's internal capital allocations are quite close to those that would have obtained had private-group practices been followed.
Interestingly, our capital misallocation measure has no effect on the likelihood of a promotion. One interpretation of this non-result is simply that the measure, though intuitive, does a poor job of capturing the extent of capital misallocation. Another is that the CCP's promotion committees do not take capital allocations into account in their decisions. This is plausible: the rules governing promotions to political offices in China ignore capital allocations. This, in turn, could free the group chairman to allocate capital in a way that apparently does impress promotion committees: avoiding layoffs and improving productivity. We investigate this possibility in the next section.
Column 3 shows interesting evidence of asymmetry: while layoffs are bad for the chairman's career prospects, large scale hiring has no effect; and while productivity improvements are rewarded, productivity impairments appear to be ignored.
The demotion models in columns 4-6 provide further nuance. Chairing a large group helps avoid being demoted, all else equal (p=0.008). Mass layoffs make a demotion significantly more likely (by a factor of 4.6; p=0.001). Productivity improvements, while good for promotions, do not shield a chairman from demotion, but chairmen who have presided over large improvements in profitability are much less likely to be demoted (p=0.041). Age makes no significant difference to the risk of demotion.
The Effects of Political Career Concerns on Internal Capital Allocation Decisions
The upshot of our analysis of promotions and demotions is that group chairmen are not evaluated directly on how they allocate capital among group member firms. Instead, they are penalized for mass layoffs that occur on their watch and rewarded for improving productivity.
We now investigate whether state-group capital allocations are a means to the end of avoiding layoffs and raising productivity. This would support our working hypothesis that capital allocation decisions at state groups reflect the group chairman's private career objectives. Table 7 allows the Q sensitivity to depend on the size of the member firm's workforce. The model shown in columns 1 and 2 classifies member firms as large if they employ more than 10,000 workers and as small otherwise. The model shown in columns 3 and 4 uses a higher cutoff of 50,000 workers. In either case, we find strong evidence that the Q sensitivity is significantly more negative when the member firm has a large workforce. To illustrate, for every unit decrease in its Q, a firm with more than 10,000 workers receives an additional 2.75% of assets in transfer payments from other group members (p<0.001); for a firm with fewer workers, the effect is a much smaller (though still significant) 0.21% of assets (p=0.028). These Q sensitivities are highly significantly different from each other (p<0.001). The corresponding numbers for the 50,000-worker cutoff are 5.7% and 0.23% of assets, respectively.
Employment Objectives
Private groups behave very differently, as the models in columns 5-6 and 7-8 show. Because private enterprises are so much smaller than SOEs (see Table 1 ), these models use cutoffs of 1,000 and 5,000 workers, respectively. In either case, we find no evidence that the Q sensitivity differs significantly for large and small firms within a private group. The coefficients on Q are positive throughout and significantly so for the smaller member firms. The lack of significance for the larger firms could either be due to power issues or it could indicate that private groups ignore Q when deciding how much capital to allocate to larger group members. Either way, the results stand in marked contrast to those for state groups, whose capital allocations strongly favor large employers with poor investment opportunities.
These results are consistent with the interpretation that social objectives -such as propping up firms with large workforces but poor prospects -influence internal capital allocation decisions at state groups. Table 8 provides further evidence along these lines. The model shown in columns 1 and 2 allows SOEs' Q sensitivity to vary with profitability. This reveals a significantly more negative Q sensitivity among loss-making member firms than among profitable ones, suggesting that state groups prop up loss-making units with poor prospects, perhaps in an effort to avoid job losses (though other reasons are certainly also possible). 
Productivity Concerns
As we saw earlier, a group chairman's chances of promotion improve after large increases in productivity. The model shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 investigates whether this in turn influences internal capital allocations by allowing the Q sensitivity to vary with a unit's total factor productivity. We find a large negative Q sensitivity of -0.694 among member firms with below-average TFP (p=0.011) and a near-zero and statistically insignificant Q sensitivity of -0.023 among member firms with above-average TFP (p=0.883). To the extent that it is easier to increase productivity the lower the level one starts from, these findings are consistent with a desire to improve productivity by way of internal capital allocations -even when doing so involves investing capital in units with poor investment opportunities as measured by Q.
Lobbying and Capture
The final model in Table 8 provides an interesting wrinkle: the negative Q sensitivity at state groups is significantly more pronounced the closer to the group parent's headquarters a member firm is located (p<0.001). In other words, for a given level of Q, state groups allocate significantly more internal capital to units that are geographically closer. One reading of this finding is that group parents have access to better information about member firms that are closer. 17 At the same time, the finding also implies that for a given distance, state groups allocate significantly more capital to units with worse prospects. This finding is hard to reconcile with an information-advantage story. It is more nearly consistent with lobbying and capture: geographic proximity enables member firms to more easily sway capital allocation decisions in their favor, even when their prospects are poor. 
Career Objectives
A testable implication of our working hypothesis that capital allocation decisions at state 17 Du, Tang, and Young (2012) show that an SOE's geographic proximity to SASAC's central office in Beijing boosts the performance evaluation scores the SOE's managers receive from SASAC, perhaps due to better information. 18 This echoes Landier, Nair, and Wulf's (2009) finding from the U.S. that business divisions located closer to headquarters are less likely to face layoffs and to be divested.
groups reflect the group chairman's private career objectives is that we should see no distortions in capital allocations when the group chairman is older than 60: as we saw in Table 6 , the chances of a promotion then are essentially nil, owing to mandatory retirement at 65 and fixed five-year terms for political offices. Table 9 provides strong support for this implication. Columns 1 and 2 estimate separate allocation models for state groups whose chairmen are older or younger than 60, respectively.
This reveals a small positive Q sensitivity for groups headed by an old chairman -the first and only time across all our models that a state group does not exhibit a negative Q sensitivity. For groups headed by a young chairman, in contrast, the Q sensitivity is large and negative, at -0.423 (p=0.01). In other words, the tendency to allocate internal capital from high-Q to low-Q member firms is only observed among state groups whose chairmen are young enough to be eligible for promotion to higher political office.
If our working hypothesis is correct, state group chairmen allocate internal capital not with a view to maximizing firm value, as private groups do, but with the aim of advancing their private career objectives. Such naked pursuit of self-interest may serve the interests of their principals in the CCP, who appear to value productivity improvements and the avoidance of job losses. But it likely also involves some degree of gaming of the promotion system for private gain, and such gaming could easily conflict with the principals' interests. For example, the preservation of jobs in the short-term may lead to larger jobs losses in the long-term, as capital that could have been deployed more productively eventually runs out.
The final two columns of Table 9 provide indirect evidence of such gaming distorting capital allocation decisions. We conjecture that the naked pursuit of self-interest and the gaming it potentially involves become riskier when the authorities crack down on graft and political corruption in the group's province. Such crackdowns often cast a wide net, and group chairmen who are gaming the system may prefer to lie low for a while. We identify 92 cases of provincelevel crackdowns on political officeholders over our sample period. 19 These form a staggered set of exogenous shocks to the risk of being held accountable for self-serving behavior among the chairmen whose groups are headquartered in the province targeted in the crackdown.
Column 3 of Table 9 shows that the Q sensitivity at state groups is significantly less negative following an anti-corruption crackdown: in the years before a crackdown, it measures -0.516 (p=0.01); in the years after, it measures a much smaller -0.147 (= -0.516+0.369; p=0.02). While far from perfect, this is a remarkable improvement.
To rule out that the crackdowns coincide in time and space with some other, non-careerrelated reason why the Q sensitivity should improve, we use private groups as a placebo. The intuition for this placebo test is that there is no reason to expect a crackdown on political officeholders to have any effect on the way private groups allocate capital internally. The estimates shown in column 4 of Table 9 confirm this prediction.
In sum, the results in Table 9 are consistent with our working hypothesis that capital allocation decisions at state groups are affected by the group chairman's private career objectives.
Conclusions
We study the efficiency of internal capital markets at state-controlled and privately owned business groups in China. Using highly granular data on within-group capital flows, we document stark differences. In private business groups, capital flows from units with relatively worse investment opportunities to units with relatively better investment opportunities. This is consistent with private business groups allocating capital efficiently, i.e., in a way that increases overall group value. State groups do the opposite: on average, they reallocate capital from firms with the best prospects to the firms with the worst prospects. Product market competition and external monitoring by minority private shareholders help discipline state groups' tendency to allocate internal capital inefficiently.
Our results suggest that state capitalism does a poor job of allocating capital efficiently, at least in the context of China's state business groups. This no doubt reflects the fact that the principal (i.e., the Chinese Communist Party) does not desire its agents to maximize profits or shareholder value above all else. As we document, its agents are instead given incentives to pursue potentially conflicting goals, including raising productivity and pursuing social objectives such as the preservation of jobs. Consistent with these incentives, we show empirically that a state group's chairman is more likely to be promoted to higher political office if he raises productivity and if he avoids layoffs at group firms.
Consistent with career concerns affecting state group behavior, we find that capital allocations are used to prop up large and struggling employers. While perhaps desirable in the short-run, propping up struggling group members in this way is unlikely to further the state's interest in the long-run: all else equal, a given amount of capital will likely create more jobs if allocated to a high-Q firm than if allocated to a low-Q firm. Letting capital flow to low-Q firms may thus avoid job losses in the short-run, but it is likely to do so at the expense of job creation at high-Q firms. Thus, this approach is unlikely to maximize the overall number of jobs.
Finally, we show that state groups allocate capital inefficiently only if the chairman has a realistic chance of being promoted and if the cost of self-interested behavior is not too high.
These findings suggest a misalignment between the interests of the state and the actions of its agents. This variable is positive for a firm receiving a net inflow from other group members and negative for a firm experiencing a net outflow to other group members. Our baseline measure includes the following group members: the group parent, a subsidiary of the listed firm, other enterprises controlled by the same parent, any firm that exercises joint control over a member firm, and any investor or firm that can exercise significant influence over the member firm. By far the most transactions (by number and by value) involve "other enterprises controlled by the same parent." Alternative sets of group members are explored in the Internet Appendix. The data come from the CSMAR database.
Net capital inflow (narrow) follows Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010) and is defined as (cash flows from other creditorsother receivables to related sales)/total assets, with each variable in the numerator reflecting transactions among group members only. This variable is positive for a firm receiving a net inflow from other group members and negative for a firm experiencing a net outflow to other group members. Our baseline measure includes the following group members: the group parent, any of the parent's subsidiaries, other enterprises controlled by the same parent, any firm that exercises joint control over a member firm, and any investor or firm that can exercise significant influence over the member firm. Alternative sets of group members are explored in the Internet Appendix. The data come from the CSMAR database.
Total assets is the book value of the firm's assets in RMB million, using data from the CSMAR database.
Size is log total assets, using data from the CSMAR database.
Sales is the firm's total sales in RMB million, using data from the CSMAR database.
Employees is defined as the total number of employees who are on the firm's regular payroll. The data come from the CSMAR database.
Tobin's Q equals the sum of the firm's market value of equity plus the book value of its debt divided by the firms total assets, all evaluated in December. The data come from the CSMAR database.
Return on assets (ROA) is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets, using data from the CSMAR database.
Total factor productivity (TFP) is measured using Olley and Pakes' (1996) semi-parametric approach. This assumes that at the beginning of every year, firms choose investment and variable input factors which together with the firm's current capital stock determine the firm's capital stock next year. We use log sales to measure output, log investment to proxy for unobserved productivity, and log employees, log inventories, and the log net value of fixed assets to capture the firm's other factor inputs. We include two state variables (firm age and log equity), an indicator variable set equal to one if a firm is delisted, and a set of industry-year fixed effects.
Firm has 'ST' status is an indicator set equal to one if the firm is in 'special treatment' (ST), a label China's stock exchanges assign to firms at risk of delisting. The data come from the WIND database.
Leverage is defined as the sum of firm's long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. The data come from the CSMAR database.
Collateral is defined as net property, plant, and equipment plus inventories scaled by total assets, using data from the CSMAR database.
Voting rights refers to the ultimate parent's control rights of the listed subsidiary, determined as the parent's ownership stake at the weakest link of the pyramidal chain. This follows La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2002) . For example, suppose that firm A owns fraction b of firm B's stock, which in turn owns fraction c of firm C. Then firm A's control rights in firm C is the weakest link in the pyramidal chain, i.e., min (b, c) . Where multiple parallel chains exist, we take the sum of the ultimate parent's control rights across these chains. The data come from the CSMAR database. Where multiple parallel chains exist, we take the sum of the ultimate parent's cash flow rights across these chains. The data come from the CSMAR database.
Cash flow rights
Cash flow wedge is defined as the difference between the voting rights and the cash flow rights of the ultimate parent.
Outside private ownership is the fraction of shares held by non-state institutions and individuals, based on data taken from the CSMAR database.
Outside state ownership is the fraction of shares held by central or local government or other state institutions, based on data taken from the CSMAR database.
Institutional ownership is defined as the fraction of the firm's ownership that is held by institutional investors. The data come from the CSMAR database.
CEO owns stock is an indicator set equal to one if the CEO owns shares in the firm, and zero otherwise. The data come from the CCER database.
Promotion and demotion models (Table 6)
Promotion is an indicator set equal to one if in year t+1, the chairman of a state business group is promoted to a political office with a higher administrative ranking than his chairman position, and zero otherwise.
Demotion is an indicator set equal to one if in year t+1, the chairman of a state business group is demoted to a political office with a lower administrative ranking than his chairman position, and zero otherwise.
Mass layoff is an indicator set equal to one if one or more of the listed subsidiaries of a state business group laid off 10% or more of its workforce in year t, and zero otherwise.
Large scale hiring is an indicator set equal to one if one or more of the listed subsidiaries of a state business group increased its workforce by at least 10% in year t, and zero otherwise.
TFP improvement is an indicator set equal to one if one or more of the listed subsidiaries of a state business group improved its total factor productivity by at least 10% in year t, and zero otherwise.
TFP impairment is an indicator set equal to one if one or more of the listed subsidiaries of a state business group suffered a fall in its total factor productivity of at least 10% in year t, and zero otherwise.
ROA improvement is an indicator set equal to one if one or more of the listed subsidiaries of a state business group increased its return on assets by at least five percentage points in year t, and zero otherwise.
ROA impairment is an indicator set equal to one if one or more of the listed subsidiaries of a state business group suffered a fall in its return on assets of at least five percentage points in year t, and zero otherwise.
Internal capital misallocation is estimated as follows. First, we generate predicted values for how state groups would have allocated capital had they followed the same rules as those estimated for private groups in column 4 of Table 2 . We then take deviations between actual and predicted net capital inflows for each SOE member firm. Finally, to arrive at a group-level summary statistic of internal capital misallocation, we take the group-year standard deviation of the estimated member-firm-level deviations.
Conditioning variables (Tables 7-9)
Large (> N employees) is an indicator set equal to one if a member firm employed more than N workers in the previous year, and zero otherwise. N employees) is an indicator set equal to one if a member firm employed no more than N workers in the previous year, and zero otherwise.
Small (up to
Loss-making is an indicator set equal to one if a member firm had strictly negative net income in the previous year, and zero otherwise.
Profitable is an indicator set equal to one if a member firm had positive net income in the previous year, and zero otherwise.
Below-average TFP is an indicator set equal to one if a member firm's total factor productivity was at or below the average in its industry in the previous year, and zero otherwise.
Above-average TFP is an indicator set equal to one if a member firm's total factor productivity was above the average in its industry in the previous year, and zero otherwise.
Close is an indicator set equal to one if the geographic distance between group headquarters and a member firm's headquarters is at or below the median distance for that business group that year, and zero otherwise. Geographic distance between city pairs is calculated using the shortest distance between two points on a sphere.
Far-away is an indicator set equal to one if the geographic distance between group headquarters and a member firm's headquarters is above the median distance for that business group that year, and zero otherwise. Geographic distance between city pairs is calculated using the shortest distance between two points on a sphere.
Old is an indicator set equal to one if the age of the chairman of a state business group is strictly above 60, and zero otherwise.
Young is an indicator set equal to one if the age of the chairman of a state business group is 60 or below, and zero otherwise. Table 2 . Q Sensitivity of Internal Capital Allocations.
The table reports tests of the sensitivity of net inflows of internal capital within a business group to investment opportunities as measured by Tobin's Q. The unit of observation is a group member firm-year. To estimate how a given group allocates its internal capital across its member firms in a given year, we include group-year fixed effects. We remove time-varying industry shocks using industry-year fixed effects. Internal capital allocations are measured using the broad measure defined in Appendix A. (For results using the narrow measure defined in Appendix A, see Table IA .1 in the Internet Appendix.) Included in the broad measure are internal capital flows between and among the parent, any of its subsidiaries (whether listed or unlisted), other enterprises controlled by the member firm's parent, and any firm or individual who exercises significant control over the member firm. For specifications using alternative measures that widen or narrow the set of entities whose capital flows are included, see Table IA .2 in the Internet Appendix. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The table tests how product market competition affects the tendency of state business groups to allocate internal capital from high-Q to low-Q member firms. To capture exogenous increases in product market competition, we use reductions in tariffs on goods imported into China. We expect these to mitigate the negative Q sensitivity among state business groups. To capture exogenous reductions in product market competition, we use increases in tariffs on goods imported into China. We expect these to aggravate the negative Q sensitivity among state business groups. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The table tests how corporate governance affects the tendency of state business groups to allocate internal capital from high-Q to low-Q member firms, with a particular focus on the influence of private outside investors. Columns 1 and 2 include the aggregate size of the equity stake held by outside private minority shareholders in our baseline model. Columns 3-4 and 5-6 allow the Q sensitivity of internal capital allocations to depend on whether outside private investors own much or little equity and whether the group parent has a large or small equity stake in the member firm (in each case evaluated at the sample median). To ensure that we continue to estimate within-group capital allocations, we keep the group structure intact in columns 3-4 and 5-6 by estimating fully interacted models allowing each coefficient to vary with the characteristic in question and including (as in Table 2 ) group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. In other words, columns 3-4 are estimated as a single model and columns 5-6 are estimated as a single model. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The table tests how the presence of state minority shareholders affects internal capital allocation decisions in private business groups. Columns 1 and 2 include the aggregate size of the equity stake held by outside state minority shareholders in our baseline model. Columns 3-4 allow the Q sensitivity of internal capital allocations to depend on whether outside state investors own much or little of the member firm's equity. To ensure that we continue to estimate within-group capital allocations, we keep the group structure intact in columns 3-4 by estimating fully interacted models allowing each coefficient to vary with the characteristic in question and including (as in Table 2 ) group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. We estimate Cox proportional hazard models of the determinants of a state-business-group chairman's promotion to a political office of higher rank (columns 1 to 3) or demotion to a lower-ranked position (columns 4 to 6). The Cox models are estimated with time-varying covariates and allow for right-censoring due to our sample period ending before each chairman's subsequent career moves are observed. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. Note that the table reports coefficients rather than hazard ratios. Heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The table allows the Q sensitivity of internal capital allocations to depend on the size of the member firm's workforce. To ensure that we continue to estimate within-group capital allocations, we keep the group structure intact by estimating fully interacted models allowing each coefficient to vary with the size of the member firm's workforce and including (as in Table 2 ) group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. For example, columns 1 and 2 are estimated as a single model. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The table allows the Q sensitivity of internal capital allocations to depend on three member-firm characteristics: the member firm's total factor productivity (TFP), profitability, and geographic distance to group headquarters. To ensure that we continue to estimate within-group capital allocations, we keep the group structure intact by estimating fully interacted models allowing each coefficient to vary with the characteristic in question and including (as in Table 2 ) group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. For example, columns 1 and 2 are estimated as a single model. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. Table 9 . Career Objectives.
The table tests whether the group chairman's career objectives affect how state business groups allocate internal capital among member firms. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample according to whether the group chairman is above or below 60 years of age. Given mandatory retirement at 65 and fixed five-year terms for political office, career objectives should only influence internal capital allocation when the group chairman is below 60. Columns 3 and 4 test for changes in the Q sensitivity of internal capital allocations following crackdowns on political corruption in the province in which the group's headquarters are located. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The table reports robustness tests of our baseline models shown in Table 2 using a narrow net capital inflow measure. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The table reports robustness tests for our baseline model shown in column 1 of Table 2 using alternative measures that widen or narrow the set of entities whose capital flows are included in either the broad (columns 1-4) or the narrow (columns 5-8) net capital inflow measure. For variable definitions and details of their construction see Appendix A. All specifications are estimated using OLS with group-year fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors clustered at the group level are shown in italics underneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-sided), respectively. The number of observations is 5,013 firm-years for a total of 287 business groups and 807 member firms. 
